Director Compensation for the Oil and Gas Industry: An Update
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Xiaoyan Cheng, Wikil Kwak, Burch Kealey, and Richard File
Director compensation issues are important, as the role of directors is to monitor managers on behalf of shareholders in the context of agency theory. However, recent research and real world anecdotes demonstrate that directors behave like friends of managers. In today's corporate environment, shareholders are supposed to take more action to monitor managers and directors. After the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act (2010), shareholder activism has been particularly more visible. This research aims to investigate director compensation issues in the oil and gas firms utilizing post-Dodd-Frank Act data. We focus on a single industry to understand better the determinants of external director compensation using current data.
Director Compensation for the Oil and Gas Industry: An Update. Cheng, Xiaoyan; Kwak, Wikil; Kealey, Burch; and File, Richard, Fall/Winter 2014, pp. 1‑14.